An important strategic challenge facing entrepreneurs and managers is the need to make choices across a set of policy alternatives (e.g., strategies, technologies, product designs), the merits of which are not initially well known. The efficacy of these choices is an increasing function of knowledge ? competence that takes the form of accurate beliefs about the relative merits of the alternatives. Yet knowledge has a second, equally important but underexplored, dimension related to confidence in those beliefs. We examine confidence from a behavioral theory perspective that points to its role in learning processes, rather than a psychological perspective. We employ a formal computational model of learning where uncertainty may make any particular experience with an alternative misleading or unrepresentative. While our model is general in its applicability, we apply it to the case of an entrepreneur pursuing a particular market opportunity. Confidence acts to moderate an entrepreneur?s willingness to disregard feedback that conflicts with her beliefs. We find that there are conditions (e.g., high uncertainty) under which confidence in beliefs, rather than the accuracy of those beliefs, is the primary driver of the efficacy of entrepreneurial choice. One implication of this observation is that a less competent (less accurate) but more confident entrepreneur may outperform a highly competent entrepreneur lacking confidence in her accurate beliefs.
All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence; then success is sure.
-Mark Twain, Letter to Mrs. Foote, Dec. 2, 1887
Introduction
Entrepreneurs and managers must make decisions in highly uncertain environments, where a central challenge is to accurately assess the value of their strategic alternatives, e.g., alternative product designs, business opportunities, technologies, markets segments. Common wisdom suggests that the efficacy of strategic and entrepreneurial choice is a function of knowledge -a "competence" in the form of accurate beliefs (judgments) about the relative merits of the alternatives (Leonard-Barton 1992, Gruber et al. 2008 , Nelson and Winter 1982 , Winter 1987 . In this study, we posit this understanding of knowledge is incomplete: Knowledge in choice situations embodies both competence (accuracy of beliefs about the alternatives) and confidence in those beliefs. Observing both, intuition immediately and correctly points to the desirability of being highly competent and confident. Yet, in examining a broader spectrum of competence and confidence, we are able to explain a somewhat puzzling but common observation -less competent but more confident entrepreneurs often seem to outperform highly competent entrepreneurs lacking confidence in their (accurate) beliefs. It is in this sense that fortune may favor foolish entrepreneurs.
In considering confidence as a dimension of knowledge, we take a Carnegie school perspective (Simon 1947 , March and Simon 1958 , Cyert and March 1963 , rather than the more common psychological perspective that focuses primarily on the level and appropriateness of confidence. The behavioral theory of the firm points to the value and importance of learning -where choice gives rise to intermediate performance feedback that may alter subsequent choices (Cyert and March 1963 , Levinthal and March 1981 , 1993 , Harrison and March 1984 , March 1994 , Rivkin 2000 , 2001 , Puranam, Powell, and Singh, 2006 , Lenox, Rockart, and Lewin 2006 , Ethiraj, Levinthal, and Roy 2008 , Vanneste and Puranam 2010 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 , Csaszar and Eggers 2013 , Posen, Lee, and Yi 2013 . Learning 3 is challenging because, in part, intermediate feedback is often noisy (Kretschmer 2008 , Eggers 2012 .
Noisy feedback engenders evaluative uncertainty that may make any particular experience with an alternative misleading or unrepresentative (Knudsen and Levinthal 2007, March 2010) . This type of learning challenge is precisely that faced by entrepreneurs and managers; many choices are not one-shot decision opportunities, rather they embody repeated choice with the potential for learning where feedback is noisy (Levinthal 2011) . For instance, an entrepreneur possessing beliefs about the merits of alternatives must make a choice and may revise her beliefs in response to feedback, or a biotech startup may evaluate a molecule and decide whether to recommit at subsequent rounds of clinical trials. Managers in established firms face similar challenges as they allocate resources across alternative investment opportunities and make subsequent milestone-based go/no-go decisions.
In focusing on the implications of confidence for the efficacy of learning, we have in mind a common situation. Consider an entrepreneur pursuing a particular market opportunity. She may employ one of three alternative technologies in pursuit of the opportunity. At the outset, she does not know which technology is best, but she has pre-entry beliefs about the relative merits of alternative technologiesbeliefs formed from her pre-entry experience (Dencker, Gruber, and Shah 2009 , Gruber et al. 2008 , 2012 . Based on her pre-entry beliefs, she initially chooses to employ one particular technology. Over time, she may update her beliefs about the relative merits of the technologies based on feedback from trialing them, and perhaps decide to change to a different technology. The efficacy of her learning process is certainly a function of her competence -accuracy of pre-entry beliefs about these alternative technologies. We argue that the efficacy of this learning process is also a function of her confidence in these pre-entry beliefs. 1 1 Confidence in pre-entry beliefs is separate from the notion of self-confidence, which reflects confidence in one's own ability. 2 The notion of a confidence-competence match is highly intuitive. In the 2004 Presidential debate, Kerry commented to Bush, "It's one thing to be certain, but you can be certain and be wrong." (South Florida Sun-Sentinel 2004) . 3 A related body of research highlights optimism (also called overplacement), in the form of positively biased beliefs (Busenitz 4 At the core of our theory is a simple and intuitive assumption about an entrepreneur's confidence.
Confidence in pre-entry beliefs moderates an entrepreneur's willingness to disregard feedback that conflicts with her pre-entry beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives. An entrepreneur who is confident in her pre-entry beliefs is resolute in her initial choices, while an entrepreneur who is unconfident in her beliefs responds quickly and willingly to feedback, often forgoing the choices indicated by her pre-entry beliefs. For example, in 1998, Google's founders, Larry Page and Sergey Brin, received repeated negative feedback as Yahoo and the broader venture capital community turned down their funding requests. Yet Page and Brin were highly confident in their pre-entry beliefs about the merits of their page-rank algorithm -and correct. They possessed knowledge along two dimensions. First, their belief about the value of their algorithm accurately reflected its underlying value. Second, they had significant confidence in their pre-entry beliefs and chose to stand-behind those pre-entry beliefs despite negative feedback.
In the behavioral theory of the firm, confidence has received relatively little attention (March 2010 ).
Yet confidence, and its implications for the ability or willingness to abandon pre-entry beliefs, is an important research topic in entrepreneurship, but the dialog takes opposing views. On one hand, scholars argue that entrepreneurs and managers must be confident in their pre-entry beliefs to avoid getting sidetracked (e.g., Kanter 2006) , "stick to the plan" (Gino 2013) , and persevere (Bhide 1994, Gimeno, Folta, Cooper, and Woo 1997) , as the Google example suggests. On the other hand, a body of research argues that entrepreneurs should not be overly confident in their pre-entry beliefs about the merits of alternative strategies. Instead, entrepreneurs need to constantly challenge their beliefs, and use feedback to update them (McGrath and MacMillan 1995, Ries 2011) as a means of "getting to plan B" (Mullins and Komisar 2010) . Indeed, this literature points to the harmful effects of confidence. For example, Kramer (2003, p.63) quotes an entrepreneur who "burned through more than $20 million trying to launch a Webbased business" as saying "Looking back on it, my judgment was often terribly wrong... Unfortunately, I was never in doubt."
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It is tempting to conclude that these divergent views on the merits of confidence can be reconciled by recognizing that confidence has limited value without competence. Indeed, intuition suggests there are benefits to a confidence match -high confidence when competent (accurate beliefs) and low confidence when less competent (e.g., Hutchinson and Alba 2001) . 2 We find that this intuition is correct when uncertainty is relatively low. However, for all but the highest competence entrepreneurs, this intuition is undermined in entrepreneurial regimes characterized by high uncertainty, which tend to be those settings with the greatest potential rewards (Knight 1921 , Kirzner 1979 . When uncertainty is high, feedback in the learning process is very noisy. The triumph of confidence in the absence of competence occurs when the benefits of ignoring the noise outweigh the costs of ignoring the signal. As a consequence, confidence -and even overconfidence -may be an important mechanism that drives the efficacy of learning through which the quality of choice decisions improve over time.
While our discussion of confidence and its implications for learning is framed within an entrepreneurial context, the importance of confidence as a dimension of knowledge deserves a more central role within the behavioral theory of the firm for two reasons. First, the management literature has highlighted the importance of learning, but its focus has been on the value and (un)reliability of experience as a source of competence (e.g., Levinthal and March 1993 ). Yet recently, March (2010) points to the under-explored role of confidence in the behavioral theory of the firm. He notes experience "is likely to generate confidence more reliably than it generates competence" (p.114). We take seriously the definition and mathematical conception of confidence in the psychology literature (Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982 , Yates 1990 , Klayman et al. 1999 , the dominant domain of confidence studies, and consider its relationship to the theory and models of learning in the Carnegie tradition (March and Simon 1958 , Cyert and March 1963 , Lave and March 1975 , March and Olsen 1975 . In doing so, we
show that the approach pursued in the psychology literature, which treats confidence as a confidence interval around a belief/judgment, is mathematically equivalent to a learner's willingness to stand firm in her beliefs in the face of disconfirming feedback -a key feature of the canonical learning models of Lave and March (1975) .
Second, the traditional view of knowledge in the management literature focuses on competence (defined rather broadly). If an organization can change only competence, as suggested by theories that point to competence and ignore confidence, greater competence is almost always better. Yet if to a certain extent confidence is a managerially tunable parameter, then under some conditions one would be better off investing in enhancing confidence than competence. Thus, while improving competence may always be a good idea, it may not always be the best idea when effort can be allocated to increase confidence. In this sense, confidence is a dimension of knowledge, which in turn suggests that confidence should have a more central role in theories of learning through which knowledge is accrued and exploited.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we review the role of confidence within a theory of learning. In section 3 we describe the setup of a computational model employing a multi-armed bandit formulation of learning under uncertainty (Holland 1975 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 and integrate an entrepreneur's confidence in beliefs into it. In section 4, we present the results of simulation experiments in which we examine the properties of the model of experiential learning as a function of competence and confidence, and how these properties may vary across alternative industry conditions.
We conclude with a discussion of implications for theory and practice.
Theoretical Background
Scholars in a wide variety of disciplines, most prominently psychologists but also statisticians and meteorologists, have been interested in the relationship between an individual's confidence in judgment and the precision of that judgment (Klayman et al. 1999) . We wish to examine confidence from the perspective of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963) , in a manner consistent with a canonical understanding of confidence. The existing literature on confidence examines the construct from two different perspectives, which we term retrospective and prospective.
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The literature taking a retrospective approach is dominant; it examines an individual's ex post evaluation of how confident she is in her prediction of, for example, a test score (e.g. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982 , Yates, 1990 , Klayman et al. 1999 We take a prospective approach to confidence, because we are interested in its implications for learning. Confidence is not just a judgment about one's own ability relative to others, or one's performance on a test. In choice situations, one has beliefs about the merits of alternatives and a confidence interval around those beliefs (per the confidence interval approach we discussed above). This confidence may affect future choices. We are not the first to make such a suggestion, but the prior literature focuses primarily on the implications of confidence for "one-shot" choices, rather than learning (repeated choice with intermediate feedback). Weick (1995) and Levinthal and Rerup (2006) study confidence as the "capacity to act." Weick (1995, pp. 6-7) argues that "accuracy is nice, but not necessary... The truth of a map lies in the action..." Thus, confidence engenders action irrespective of truth. In contrast, others assume that the actions of individuals are intentionally rational. For instance, Camerer and Lovallo (1999) study the impact of confidence for entrepreneurial entry decisions. In a lab experiment, they find subjects asked to make an entry decision tend to overestimate their chances of success, which they suggest is a plausible explanation for high rates of business failure. Wu and Knott (2006) examine overconfidence in an empirical study of entry into US commercial banking; they find that 8 patterns of entry (and thus the entry decision) suggest that entrepreneurs are overconfident with respect to their own ability.
We examine confidence in repeated choice situations, when learning from intermediate feedback is
possible. 4 In the context of learning, the importance of confidence as a dimension of knowledge is inextricably tied to uncertainty. In choice situations, the term uncertainty may be used in a number of different, albeit related, ways. We are interested in uncertainty that has been called "evaluative uncertainty" (Knudsen and Levinthal 2007) . While learning from intermediate feedback as a means of enhancing the efficacy of choice is appealing (Levinthal and March 1981, March et al. 1991) , its value is somewhat diminished because feedback is "prone to inscrutable variation due to unknown controlling variables, inaccurate feedback, and perhaps even some truly random error" (Klayman 1988, p.115) .
Evaluative uncertainty -noisy feedback -makes any particular experience with an alternative misleading or unrepresentative (Knudsen and Levinthal 2007, March 2010) and magnifies the behavioral and cognitive challenges of learning (March and Olsen 1975 , March, Sproull, and Tamuz 1991 , Levinthal and March 1993 , Knudsen and Levinthal 2007 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 . Evaluative uncertainty may vary across contexts and industries. For example, it is likely to be low for a new dry cleaner or local restaurant, while it is typically very high for a technology or biotech startup.
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Under evaluative uncertainty, confidence impacts an entrepreneur's willingness to hold firm in her initial beliefs given disconfirming feedback post entry. Consider research on the value of pre-entry knowledge in an entrepreneurial context (Shane 2000 , Chen, Williams, and Agarwal 2012 , Dencker, Gruber, and Shah 2009 , Gruber et al. 2008 . To the extent that pre-entry experience indeed implies useful knowledge about appropriate choices, we claim an entrepreneur's willingness (or unwillingness) to forgo 4 In recent work, Van den Steen (2011) examines how confidence changes over time for a Bayesian agent engaged in learning.
5 There are two other important uses of the term uncertainty, which, while related, are theoretically distinct concepts. First, in one-shot choice situations, uncertainty may be used to reflect a paucity of knowledge about the relative merits of alternatives. That is, one may be uncertain about which alternative is best. Second, in situations of choice and subsequent feedback, uncertainty may reflect causal ambiguity. That is, uncertainty about cause-effect linkages in the sense of a lack of knowledge of which choice/action is the cause of a particular observed outcome.
her pre-entry beliefs in the face of disconfirming feedback is a function of confidence. As a consequence, we explicitly examine the moderating effect of confidence on learning and its implications for performance.
We define both competence and confidence in choice situations on the basis of an entrepreneur's pre-entry beliefs about the merits of alternatives. Consistent with a simple statistical understanding of knowledge in choice situations, competence reflects the accuracy of an entrepreneur's pre-entry beliefs with respect to the unobservable reality. More accurate beliefs exhibit a smaller error relative to the true but unknown returns to the various alternatives. This accuracy view of competence is observed in both the theoretical and empirical strategy literatures. In the theoretical literature, for example, Levitt and March (1988) posit competence derives from experience, which establishes beliefs about the merits of alternatives. In the empirical literature, Makadok and Walker (2000) study the competence of money market mutual fund firms in forecasting the returns of different investment alternatives, and Coff (1999) studies competence in terms of the ability to accurately assess the value of acquisition targets' assets.
Similarly, we define confidence as an entrepreneur's confidence interval around her beliefs. Our notion of confidence as an interval reflects an intuitive statistical understanding of the construct, and is consistent with a vast literature in psychology (e.g., Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips 1982 , Yates 1990 , Klayman et al. 1999 ). As we noted earlier, we will show that the confidence interval approach is mathematically equivalent to confidence in the form of an entrepreneur's ability and willingness to stand firm in her pre-entry beliefs. That is, a smaller confidence interval around pre-entry beliefs, which reflects higher confidence, is mathematically equivalent to the claim that an entrepreneur places more weight on her pre-entry beliefs and less on any intermediate feedback, whether it confirms or disconfirms those beliefs.
To understand the implications of competence and confidence for the efficacy of entrepreneurial choice, we anchor our formal development on the multi-armed bandit model. This model is the canonical representation of learning under conditions of uncertainty (Holland 1975 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 ). The bandit model takes its name from a slot machine analogy in which an entrepreneur seeks to maximize the flow of returns over time. In each period, she chooses one alternative from a set of policy alternatives where the payoff to an alternative is drawn from a given probability distribution. The entrepreneur does not know the payoffs to the alternatives but can form beliefs about them, which are refined over time through a process of learning. Based on her beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives, the entrepreneur makes a choice from the set of alternatives, receives feedback from the environment in the form of an outcome signal, and updates her beliefs. Thus, the entrepreneur is portrayed as possessing a mental model or cognitive map derived from her own prior experience that encapsulates her understanding of the merits of the available set of choices. We build on this canonical model by formally considering both the entrepreneur's pre-entry beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives and her confidence associated with those beliefs. We endow entrepreneurs with different initial levels of competence (accuracy) and confidence, and examine the implications for subsequent choice and learning. We identify conditions under which confidence in pre-entry beliefs, rather than the accuracy of those beliefs, is the primary driver of the efficacy of entrepreneurial choice and subsequent learning. We also identify the mechanisms underlying those conditions.
Model
To examine the implications of confidence for the efficacy of learning, we implement a multi-armed bandit model. The bandit model (Gittins 1979, Berry and Fristedt 1985) has been the subject of significant study because its underlying structure closely resembles a variety of realistic choice situations ranging from research settings such as R&D projects (Hardwick and Stout 1992) , to strategic choices such as product pricing (Bergemann and Välimäki 1996) , risk-taking (March 1996, Denrell and March 2001) and organizational responses to environmental turbulence (Posen and Levinthal 2012) . Two common features underlying managerial problems are modeled in a bandit framework. First, information about the returns to an alternative can only be gathered by sampling it. Second, feedback from trials is subject to uncertainty that gives rise to variation in possible outcomes, and as such, any particular experience is likely to be misleading.
Formally, the bandit model reflects a sequential choice problem in which, at each point in time, t, an entrepreneur must choose among N alternatives. The payoff to alternative i={1,…,N} is drawn from a standard normal distribution such that the state of the environment can be described by the vector of payoffs to the alternatives, P Prior to the first period, the entrepreneur has pre-entry beliefs, =[ 1 ,…, N ], about the payoffs of
Thus, pre-entry beliefs are a linear combination of the real payoff p i of alternative i and an error term i that is drawn from the same distribution as the payoff, i.e., i N(0, 1). The parameter [0,1]controls the extent pre-entry beliefs are correlated with the real payoffs. If =1, the entrepreneur holds fully accurate pre-entry beliefs across the alternatives in the sense that her beliefs match the payoffs of the alternatives, i.e., = P. 6 If =0, the entrepreneur has non-informative or random pre-entry beliefs across the alternatives. We refer to an entrepreneur who has more (less) accurate pre-entry beliefs as being more (less) competent.
In period t=1, the entrepreneur acts solely on her pre-entry beliefs and selects the alternative that is believed to yield the highest payoff based on . In each subsequent period t{2,3,4…T}, the entrepreneur engages in learning to refine her beliefs and maximize the value of the payoffs. In particular, 12 the entrepreneur makes a choice from the set of alternatives, and receives feedback from the environment in the form of an outcome, r i,t . 7 If this represents the first time a particular alternative is sampled postentry, the updated belief about that alternative corresponds to the performance feedback received, i.e., b i,t (1) = r i,t . Consistent with stochastic learning models (Bush and Mosteller 1955 , Lave and March 1975 , Sutton and Barto 1998 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 , in all subsequent periods, we assume that the entrepreneur's post-entry beliefs b i,t about the payoff of alternative i in period t is proportional to the difference between the feedback she receives, r i,t , and her beliefs, b i,t . Specifically, the entrepreneur's post-entry beliefs are updated according to
where [0,1] is the learning rate and k i > 0 is the number of trials associated with alternative i until period t.
We define i,t as the entrepreneur's composite beliefs, incorporating both her pre-entry beliefs i 
Thus, higher confidence, a larger parameter c, reflects a situation in which an entrepreneur places more weight on her pre-entry beliefs, , and less on the post-entry beliefs, b i,t . Substituting (1) and (2) into (3), we obtain composite beliefs as
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In period t, the entrepreneur acts based on her composite beliefs, i,t , about the various alternatives selecting the alternative which she believes to have the highest payoff. The following equations summarize how the entrepreneur updates her composite beliefs about alternative i:
The parameter c, which in the formulation above affects a weighting of pre-entry beliefs and postentry beliefs, is mathematically equivalent to a confidence interval around pre-entry beliefs. Formally, the 95 percent confidence interval around pre-entry beliefs is given by (6) Thus, a higher level of confidence, c [0,1], translates into a smaller confidence interval around pre-entry beliefsbecause is a decreasing function of c. A smaller confidence interval reflects higher confidence in the pre-entry beliefs. Thus, confidence in the form of an entrepreneur's ability and willingness to stand firm in her pre-entry beliefs is equivalent to a confidence interval approach employed in the psychology literature. For a general derivation of the confidence interval in each period t, please refer to the Appendix 1.
Analysis
In the following sections, we exercise the model, showing results for the case of 50 choice alternatives with payoffs drawn from a standard normal distribution. Each experiment involves 50,000 simulation runs. In our primary results, we report long-run performance (in period t=500) by which steady state is achieved, averaged over the 50,000 runs. In each experiment, the entrepreneurs learn at a moderate rate of =0.5. In our first experiment, we examine the interplay between the accuracy of preentry beliefs (competence) and the confidence in these beliefs. We hold evaluative uncertainty constant at a moderate level, setting the variance of the signal to 2 =3. In our sensitivity analysis, we report cumulative performance measures and alternative learning rates, finding that the results are qualitatively unchanged. In the second experiment, we examine how industry characteristics, such as uncertainty, number of viable alternative choices, and the difference in returns between good and poor alternatives affect the relationship between competence and confidence.
Experiment 1: Interplay of Confidence and Competence

Confidence Can Compensate for a Lack of Competence
In the first set of analysis, we examine the conditions under which confidence in pre-entry beliefs can compensate for a lack of competence. Figure 1a reports the average long-run performance in period t=500 (y-axis) over the full range of confidence (x-axis), i.e., from no confidence in pre-entry beliefs (c=0) to full confidence in them (c=1). We do so across three levels of competence. The low-competence entrepreneurs are endowed with inaccurate pre-entry beliefs (=0.1) about the payoffs of the alternatives they are facing, while the high-competence entrepreneurs are endowed with highly accurate pre-entry beliefs (=0.9). The entrepreneurs with moderate competence in between are endowed with pre-entry beliefs reflected by =0.5. In Appendix 2, we replicate the structure of The performance achieved by entrepreneurs with moderate competence is surprising. As one would expect, our results indicate that for any given level of confidence, a more competent entrepreneur outperforms a less competent entrepreneur. Yet, in the comparison between the middle and right panels, we observe that entrepreneurs with moderate competence (moderately accurate pre-entry beliefs) but high confidence in their beliefs can outperform more competent entrepreneurs who lack confidence in their highly accurate pre-entry beliefs. We focus on this result in Panel (b) of Figure 1 , which displays a zoomed version of the middle panel of Figure 1a . The solid line reflects the performance for entrepreneurs with moderate competence. The flat dotted line reflects the benchmark performance of high-competence entrepreneurs who lack confidence (c=0.1) in their pre-entry beliefs. Figure 1b shows that the performance of the less competent but more confident entrepreneurs (solid line) is higher than the performance of the more competent but less confident entrepreneurs (benchmark dashed line) over the range of confidence from 0.2<c<0.9, i.e., between points R and S. Thus, confidence can (over)compensate for a lack of competence. Interestingly, the moderate-competence entrepreneurs need to be only slightly more confident (c>0.2) than the high-competence but low-confidence entrepreneurs (who hold a confidence of c=0.1) to achieve superior performance. Only when the less competent entrepreneurs become too highly confident (c>0.9) in their inaccurate pre-entry beliefs, does their performance drop below that of the more competent entrepreneurs.
The traditional view of knowledge in the management literature, in theories of capabilities or routines, and in theories of learning and knowledge accumulation, primarily focus on competence. The key result in Figure 1 is that a less competent but more confident entrepreneur can outperform a more competent entrepreneur lacking confidence in her pre-entry beliefs. This does not imply that competence is irrelevant. Indeed, in our results, if one can change only competence (as suggested by theories that point to competence and ignore confidence), greater competence is almost always better. Yet knowledge embodies both competence and confidence. If entrepreneurs, managers, and even organizations can tune confidence -if to a certain extent confidence is a choice -then under some conditions it would be better to invest in increasing confidence than competence. Thus, while improving competence may always be a good idea, it may not always be the best idea when effort can be allocated to increasing confidence.
In Figure 2 , we systematically identify the conditions where effort may be beneficially allocated to increasing confidence. To do so, we examine all combinations of confidence and competence. We then identify the competence-confidence combinations for which an entrepreneur should focus effort on enhancing confidence rather than competence. Confidence should be the focus of effort in two major ways. First, confidence may compensate for a lack of competence. If resources are limited and increasing competence and confidence are costly, then effort to increase competence may be misplaced. Under some conditions an increase in confidence can compensate for the drop in competence. One can imagine conditions under which competence is reduced (employee turnover, environmental turbulence, etc.).
Intuition suggests that the firm should allocate effort to rebuild the lost competence, however we demonstrate that the better response is sometimes an increase in confidence. In this sense confidence compensates for competence. In the second, confidence, rather than competence, is the dominant driver of improving performance. That is, the marginal returns to increasing confidence may exceed the marginal returns to increasing competence. Above the diagonal, we observe only negatively sloped indifference curves. For example, consider a combination of high competence (=0.7) and low confidence (c=0.15) indicated by point V on the indifference curve, which reflects a long-run performance of 1.6. Here, a small increase in confidence can compensate for a substantial decrease in competence. To stay on the same indifference curve of 1.6, an entrepreneur can compensate for a substantial loss in competence (e.g., from =0.7 to =0.3) with a comparatively small increase in confidence (from c=0.15 to c=0.2). Thus, we observe a substitution effect where an increase in confidence in pre-entry beliefs can compensate for a lack of competence.
While the indifference curves allow us to examine the conditions under which an increase in confidence can compensate for a lack of competence, the gradients of these indifference curves in Figure   2a help us to understand the changes in the level of competence and confidence that generate the largest performance improvements. For confidence-competence combinations that are above the diagonal (running from the lower left corner to the upper right corner), the gradients mainly point east. In this area, the dominant driver of improving performance is improving confidence rather than competence: Holding confidence constant, an increase in an entrepreneur's competence has little effect on her performancethere are no/little returns to increasing competence. However, an entrepreneur can significantly improve her performance by enhancing the confidence in her pre-entry beliefs. 8 Below the diagonal, the gradients mainly point to the northwest. This area reflects the intuitive situation in which the dominant driver of improving performance is improving competence but concurrently decreasing confidence.
Recall the key idea is that knowledge is not only competence but also confidence. Figure 2b summarizes the implications for the allocation of effort between competence and confidence. For confidence-competence combinations plotted white, there are no positive returns to increasing confidence; firms should enhance their competence instead. For all non-white combinations, returns to improving confidence are positive and compensation is possible. Increasing confidence can offset the performance decline of a drop in competence. Light gray indicates that returns to increasing confidence are positive but smaller than the returns to improving competence; consequently, firms should focus their efforts to improve competence, although effort allocated to improve confidence would also yield positive returns. With dark gray combinations, the returns to improving confidence are higher than those of improving competence. With these combinations, firms should focus on improving confidence, not competence. Finally, black combinations suggest that returns to improving confidence are positive while returns to enhancing confidence are negative. Thus, firms should focus exclusively on improving confidence; any effort to enhance competence will yield negative returns.
For all combinations above the diagonal (and some below), returns to confidence are positive (nonwhite). In other words, investing to improve confidence is a sensible strategy for firms if they exhibit little confidence although they are quite competent. Indeed, for most of these combinations, these returns are even higher than for competence (dark gray and black). If firms are moderately competent but extremely unconfident, returns to competence can become negative (black).
In sum, when we consider knowledge as consisting of both competence and confidence, improving confidence yields positive returns for many confidence-competence combinations. Our results also 19 suggest that improving competence has positive effects most of the time. But interestingly, even when there are positive returns to increasing competence, effort allocated to increasing confidence is the dominant strategy for the majority of confidence-competence combinations.
How Confidence Can Compensate for a Lack of Competence
In the previous section, we focused on the implications of confidence as a dimension of knowledge.
We identified conditions when confidence can compensate for a lack of competence. We now seek to understand how confidence compensates for competence. To uncover the specific mechanisms through which confidence can compensate for competence, we decompose the performance impact of confidence (in Figure 1 ) into two components: (1) a performance effect driven by the pure signal in the feedback, and For entrepreneurs with very high competence (Panel b), the performance contribution of the signal is zero and the performance contribution of the noise component is always negative, matching the net performance. Obviously, for entrepreneurs with fully accurate pre-entry beliefs, there is no value to learning -and this holds true even if feedback is fully certain (contains no noise). Given evaluative uncertainty, the noise component of feedback is uninformative and is likely to lead an entrepreneur with accurate pre-entry beliefs astray. As such, an entrepreneur endowed with fully accurate pre-entry beliefs ideally should have high confidence in her pre-entry beliefs.
In Figure 4 , we decompose the performance contribution of the noise component of feedback for entrepreneurs with moderate competence. 9 The dotted line reports the benefits from uninformative, noisy feedback and the solid line displays its costs (y-axis) as functions of confidence (x-axis). We measure the benefit of noise as the average performance difference between the best alternative an entrepreneur ever samples during the 500 periods and the alternative sampled in the first period. The costs of noise are calculated as the average performance difference between the best alternative sampled during the 500 periods and the alternative that the entrepreneur samples in the last period t=500. The net effect of the two components is plotted as the dashed line fully reconstructing the performance contribution of the noise component from disconfirming signals, i.e., feedback that indicates a value below current beliefs, can potentially induce an entrepreneur to abandon the currently preferred alternative in favor of exploration. In the absence of such feedback, the entrepreneur will stick to her currently preferred alternative. The positive effects of exploration induced through noise begins to surface as soon as confidence drops below c=1 (slightly less than full confidence). At the same time, the induced-exploration benefits of noise are subject to declining marginal returns and the curve flattens as confidence drops below c=0.7.
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The costs of the noise component (solid line) are nearly linear. The negative effect of noise begins to surface as soon as confidence drops below c=1 (slightly less than full confidence). The cost of noise reflects the possibility of abandoning the best alternative sampled and settling on a somewhat inferior choice. Because of noisy feedback a lower-confidence entrepreneur may erroneously come to the belief that a truly attractive alternative has a low payoff, and therefor permanently abandon it. At higher levels of confidence, these types of errors are less likely to occur. Combined, the benefits and costs of noise depicted in Figure 4 fully reconstruct the net effect of noise (dashed line in Figure 4 ), explaining the effect of noise result in Figure 3a (dashed line) for entrepreneurs with moderate competence. At low levels of confidence, the costs of noise outweigh its benefits, while the benefits more than compensate for the costs of noise at high levels of confidence.
In sum, when learning is an important driver of performance outcomes, under some conditions confidence can compensate for a lack of competence. The value of confidence emerges when uncertainty takes the form of noisy feedback that may hamper the learning process. Confidence moderates an entrepreneur's willingness to disregard feedback that conflicts with her pre-entry beliefs. In disregarding feedback, the entrepreneur forgoes the signal in the feedback, but also the noise. Confidence can compensate for a lack of competence when the benefits of ignoring the noise outweigh the costs of ignoring the signal. When this is so, the returns for enhanced confidence may be greater than enhanced competence. As such, to understand the efficacy of learning that builds upon pre-entry knowledge, we must consider knowledge as having two dimensions: competence and confidence.
Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative model specifications. Figure 5 summarizes this sensitivity analysis. To compare our main result from Figure 1b of a moderate competent entrepreneur (=0.5) with the results across the different settings in the sensitivity analysis, we normalize performance by an entrepreneur who has high competence (=0.9) but lacks confidence in her pre-entry beliefs (c=0.1). To facilitate interpretation, in all panels of Figure 5 the solid lines represent the normalized performance from Figure 1 as a baseline.
< Insert Figure 5 about here > First, in Figure 5a we examine the sensitivity of our key findings with respect to alternative performance measures. The solid line reflects the (normalized) average long-run performance in t=T=500 employed in our previous experiments. This measure represents a discounting rate where only the last 23 period is taken into account. The dashed line reports cumulative performance without discounting so that every period is equally weighted. The dotted line reflects cumulative performance with exponential discounting where the first periods are weighted more strongly, while the dotted-dashed line displays exponential discounting where the last periods are weighted more strongly. In sum, Figure 5a demonstrates that the qualitative pattern of results do not depend on the performance measure. In addition, we varied the duration of the simulation and analyzed T={250, 500, 1000}. We find that our results are robust for different choices of T.
Second, in Figure 5b we examine how an entrepreneur's alternative search strategies, which differentially balance exploration and exploitation (March 1991) , affect our results. We report our main result for different -greedy choice rules. In the -greedy strategy the entrepreneur employs the alternative she believes best 1-percent of the time and selects an alternative at random percent of the time (Sutton and Barto 1998). The solid line reflects the greedy choice rule employed in our main experiments;
entrepreneurs choose the alternative they believe is associated with the highest payoff (=0). We increase exploration, , to =0.1 (dotted line) and =0.5 (dashed line). The results are qualitatively unchanged across levels of exploration.
Third, we examine the sensitivity of our key findings with respect to the learning rate (Lave and March 1975, March 1991 In sum, the basic mechanism by which confidence acts as a dimension of knowledge is robust across a broad body of alternative model specifications.
Experiment 2: Moderating Role of Industry Characteristics
In the first experiment, we examined the joint implications of confidence and competence for performance. In our second experiment, we are interested in how our key findings on the value of 24 confidence are affected by the characteristics of the industry task environment. We focus on three common industry characteristics that may alter the value of confidence as a dimension of knowledge: (1) level of evaluative uncertainty, and (2) the difference in returns between good and poor alternatives. In
Figures 6 and 7, we examine industry contexts that vary on these dimensions. In each case, the result from Experiment 1 (Figure 2 ) sits at the middle of the interval between the low and high settings we examine here.
Industries may vary in the extent of uncertainty. For example, uncertainty is likely to be low for a new dry cleaner or local restaurant, while it is typically very high for a technology or biotech startup.
Indeed, entrepreneurial contexts are often portrayed as particularly uncertain (Knight 1921) . 11 In Figure 6 , we examine the returns to improving confidence for low levels of uncertainty ( The results suggest that the distribution of alternatives does not qualitatively change the area in which there are positive returns to increasing confidence (shaded areas in Figure 8 ). However, within the area of positive returns to increasing confidence, as the share of good alternatives increases, the area with negative returns to increasing competence (black area) grows. In these industries characterized by a large share of good alternatives, confidence is an important driver of performance outcomes.
In sum, our model predicts that in industries characterized by high uncertainty, a large set of viable alternative positions, and a large share of good alternatives, confidence is an important dimension of knowledge. That is, in such industries, observed performance may be driven as much (or more) by confidence than by competence.
Discussion
Knowledge is a central construct in the management literature and is often thought to explain performance differences across firms (Simon 1947 , Nelson and Winter 1982 , Grant 1996 . In these discussions, knowledge takes many forms: routines, capabilities, competences, mental models, or cognitive maps. In choice situations, knowledge may take the form of more accurate beliefs about the merits of policy alternatives (e.g., strategies, product designs, business opportunities). This knowledge enables managers and entrepreneurs to make better strategic choices and as such, engenders superior performance (Simon 1955; March 1991; Levinthal 1997) . Our central theoretical argument is that knowledge is not a unidimensional construct, rather it embodies two distinct dimensions: the accuracy of beliefs about the relative merits of alternatives (which we call competence), and the confidence in those beliefs.
If knowledge is a theoretically central construct in management, then the mechanisms by which it is created must also be of central importance (Ethiraj, Kale, Krishnan, and Singh 2005) . It is now commonplace to think of knowledge as the outcome of a learning process, and to have in mind a process that looks somewhat like a learning curve (Argote 1999) . We may then consider how firms combine internal and external experience to progress along the learning curve (Posen and Chen 2013 ). Yet, implicitly or explicitly, these studies primarily focus on knowledge as competence, often leaving the role of confidence underexplored.
Confidence is a construct that has long drawn the attention of scholars in a wide variety of disciplines, most prominently psychology, where the key idea is that of the relationship between one's confidence in judgment and the precision of that judgment (Klayman et al. 1999) . This research focuses predominantly on the existence of overconfidence and the factors that may moderate it. We seek to examine confidence from the perspective of the behavioral theory of the firm (Simon 1947 , March and Simon 1958 , Cyert and March 1963 , focusing on its implications for learning. We seek to do so in a manner consistent with a canonical understanding of confidence as a confidence interval around beliefs.
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In our theory, confidence is a central component of knowledge because it moderates an entrepreneur's willingness to disregard feedback that conflicts with her initial beliefs about the merits of alternatives.
Importantly, we demonstrate that confidence (the willingness to disregard feedback) is mathematically equivalent to a confidence interval around beliefs as employed in the psychology literature.
It seems intuitive that confidence and competence should go hand-in-hand: competence (accuracy)
should have limited value without confidence, just as confidence should have limited value without competence. It is tempting to conclude that the challenge is to align competence with confidence: high confidence in accurate beliefs and low confidence in inaccurate beliefs. Our model supports this intuition but not unambiguously. We identify two conditions where this intuition falls short. First, it falls short when the marginal returns to increasing confidence exceed the marginal returns to increasing competence.
Thus, if resources are limited and increasing competence and confidence are costly, then effort to increase competence may be misplaced. Second, it also falls short when competence is reduced by mechanisms such as employee turnover, environmental turbulence etc. Intuition suggests the firm should allocate efforts to rebuild the lost competence. However, we find that in some cases, an increase in confidence can compensate for the drop in competence. This further implies that there is value in a competenceconfidence mismatch, because when competence decreases, confidence should increase.
Twain claimed "All you need in this life is ignorance and confidence; then success is sure." In the context of entrepreneurship, many observers and entrepreneurs would probably claim to have seen many such cases. The mechanism often suggested to explain this adage is luck -the confident entrepreneur enters, accepts her losses, and foolishly enters again until she -by luck -succeeds. Our theory suggests an alternative to the luck mechanism. Confidence alters the way entrepreneurs interpret feedback from the world, which turns out to be centrally important given evaluative uncertainty (noisy feedback) that magnifies the behavioral and cognitive challenges of learning (March and Olsen 1975 , March, Sproull, and Tamuz 1991 , Levinthal and March 1993 , Knudsen and Levinthal 2007 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 . When uncertainty is low, competence dominates. But as uncertainty increases, confidence takes on an increasingly important role in learning. Given sufficiently high uncertainty, the entrepreneur's challenge is not of responding to the signal, but rather, the ability to "not respond" to the signal when it is conflated with a great deal of noise. In such a situation, confidence -and even overconfidence -may be an important mechanism that drives the efficacy of learning.
This basic intuition leads to the possibility that differences across industries systematically alter the relative rewards to confidence versus competence. Much of our analysis revolves around evaluative uncertainty. It seems clear that uncertainty will be low for a new dry cleaner, local restaurant, or a production facility expansion, while it will typically be very high for a technology or biotech startup, or a new corporate R&D project. Our results would suggest that in the latter context, confidence will be more important than in the former context. Yet, uncertainty is but one of many industry features that affect the role of confidence as a dimension of knowledge. We examine parameters that reflect the munificence of an industry in the sense that there are more versus fewer good outcomes, as well as the number of viable positions (choice alternatives) in an industry. In both cases, we find that there are conditions under which rewards to increasing confidence exceed those of increasing competence, and indeed, there is even compensation -when a reduction in competence can be offset by an increase in confidence. In general, features of an industry that make learning more challenging also increase the rewards to confidence.
Our discussion of confidence in the context of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert and March 1963 ) has important implications for our understanding of a number of phenomena. First, consider the broad discussion in the strategy literature on the conditions under which entrants can outperform incumbents (e.g., Lieberman 1989) . The claim that overconfidence spurs excess entry is well known and seems to make intuitive sense (Camerer and Lovallo 1999, Wu and Knott 2007) . Excess entry is typically interpreted as being socially inefficient, although recent research suggests potential benefits (Knott and Posen 2005) . Consider an entrepreneur who is overconfident in her pre-entry beliefs. Overconfidence would spur an entry that seems on the surface incorrect -an entry decision that a "fully rational" entrepreneur would not make. But the overconfidence in her pre-entry beliefs driving her entry decision 29 may be inseparable from the implications of overconfidence that affects how she learns post entry. Her overconfidence may more than offset any lack of competence when uncertainty is high. Thus, our theory predicts that overconfident entrepreneurs who enter an industry may be precisely those that displace incumbents, and the likelihood of this outcome should be an increasing function of uncertainty.
Second, our study contributes to ongoing efforts by scholars examining the challenges of learning (e.g., Levitt and March 1988 , Levinthal and March 1993 , Rivkin 2000 , 2001 , Puranam et al. 2006 , Ethiraj et al. 2008 , March 2010 , Vanneste and Puranam 2010 , Posen and Levinthal 2012 , Csaszar and Eggers 2013 , Posen, Lee, and Yi 2013 . A broad body of research points to the need to overcome problems of under-exploration and the mechanisms by which this objective may be achieved (Siggelkow and Levinthal 2003 , Siggelkow and Rivkin 2005 ). Yet recent research on learning has begun to point to the challenge of excess-exploration (Posen and Levinthal 2012) . When the problem of excess exploration binds, organizations may engender confidence as a means of rebalancing exploration and exploitation.
Third, existing research points to the importance of experience as a driver of firm performance (Lieberman 1984 , Argote 1999 . Consider a setting in which entrepreneurs are assumed to possess preentry experience (Shane 2000 , Chen, Williams, and Agarwal 2012 , Dencker, Gruber, and Shah 2009 , Gruber et al. 2008 ). The claim is the pre-entry experience engenders knowledge that enhances an entrepreneur's subsequent performance. Yet March (2010, p.114 ) recently highlights the under-explored role of confidence, noting that experience "is likely to generate confidence more reliably than it generates competence." Our theory suggests that confidence engendered by pre-entry experience may more important than the competence engendered by that experience. Related to this idea, our theory has implications for the outcomes of serial entrepreneurs (Gompers, Kovner, Lerner, and Scharfstein 2010).
Serial entrepreneurs are usually assumed to be successful because of competence, which may be endowed exogenously or the result of prior experience; we contend confidence may be an important driver of the performance of serial entrepreneurs. A prior success, even one that is purely the result of luck, may 30 significantly increase an entrepreneur's confidence -in contexts of high uncertainty, confidence alone may explain subsequent success.
In sum, knowledge plays a central role in the management literature. We seek to enhance our understanding of the joint implications of competence and confidence for the efficacy of learning, and in turn, future performance. Confidence becomes central in contexts where firms make repeated decisions across a set of alternatives under uncertainty. The issues surrounding the implications of confidence for learning remain a fertile and important line of inquiry for organizational scholars. 
